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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CENT UR IAN CORPORATION,

)
)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

)

)
)

vs.

)
)

A. L. CRIPPS, and WALTER CRIPPS,
Defendants and
Respondents,

PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC.,
Plaintiff in
Intervention and
Respondent
vs.
CENTURIAN CORPORATION,
RICHARD K. NICKLES and MARGARET K.
NICKLES,

)
)
)
)

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO.
16971

)
)

)

Defendant in
Intervention and
Appellants.

)
)

)

BRIEF IN ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING

NATURE OF CASE
Centurian Corporation ("Centurian") brought a action
against A. L. Cripps and Walter A. Cripps ("Cripps"), claiming
amounts due under an agreement wherein Centurian Corporation
had given possession of a tank trailer to Cripps.

Petty Motor
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Lease; Inc. moved to intervene in the action claiming an interest in the tank trailer by having entered into agreements with

.

Centurian and Richard and Margaret K. Nickles {"Nickles").

The

motion was granted and trial was held with all parties, including Petty Motor Lease, Inc., present.

Following trial, the

trial court held that it was without jurisdiction of the complaint in intervention of Petty Motor Lease, Inc. against Centurian and Nickles.

This Court reversed and remanded with in-

structions that the trial court enter judgment in accordance
with the evidence presented at trial.
A. L. Cripps, et.

al~,

Centurian Corporation v.

Petty Motor Lease, Inc. v. Centurian

Corporation, et. al., 577 P. 2d 955 {Utah 1978).

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Following remand from this Court, judgment was entered
in favor of Petty Motor Lease, Inc., against Centurian and Niekles.

Petty Motor Lease, Inc., Centurian and Nickles sought

additional relief from the trial court by way of motions to
amend but such motions were denied.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Petty Motor Lease, Inc., sought the affirmation by
this Court as to the liability of Centurian and Nickles.

Petty

Motor Lease, Inc. cross-appealed as to the amount due, the rate
of interest and for an award of attorney's fees, including fees
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on appeal.

In its decision, this court addressed all the is-

sues presented to it, including those raised by Centurian

an~

Nickles in their appeal, and awarded Petty Motor Lease the
amount claimed and attorneys fees, but denied Petty Motor's
claim regarding interest.

Centurian and Nickles have petition-

ed for rehearing from this Court's decision filed January 19,
1981.

Petty Motor Lease, Inc. submits that the Petition for

Rehearing should be denied.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Petty Motor Lease, Inc. refers to the Statement of
Facts contained in its Brief of Respondent, pages 3 through 6.
In addition, it is pertinent to note certain provisions of the
Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase.

The Lease called for

32 monthly payments of $580.00, a total of $18,560.00, plus use
tax.

In addition, Centurian deposited with Petty Motor Lease,

Inc., at the inception of the agreement the sum of $3,594.63.
Paragraph two of the Agreement of Sale and Purchase
provides as follows:
It is agreed that the user [Centurian] will pay to the
owner [Petty Motor Lease, Inc.] the sum of Six Hundred
Twenty-·One and 00/100 Dollars plus applicable sales tax and
interest at six percent per annum (6%), plus any deposits
or advance payments made and owner shall keep all payments
made or monies paid or deposited under the terms of the
lease referred to above.
The total amount contemplated to be paid under the
Agreement of Sale and

Purchas~

is $18,560 by monthly payments,
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$3,594.63 by deposit or a total sum of $22,154.63, and $621.00
plus interest.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE SUPREME COURT SUFFICIENTLY ADDRESSED THE
ISSUE OF MARGARET K. NICKLES' LIABILITY; THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC. AND CENTURIAN, GUARANTEED BY
MARGARET NICKLES INVOLVED A SECURITY INTEREST SUBJECT TO
THE LAW OF SALES.
This Court clearly dealt with the issue Centurian and
Nickles raise in their Petition for Rehearing regarding Margaret Nickles' liability.

In considering the issue of whether

the agreements between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Centurian
constituted a lease or a sale, this Court stated, in part:
Under Utah law, when a transaction purports on its
face to be a lease, but is in fact a sale with reservation
of a security interest in the vendor, it becomes subject to
·the law of sales.
"Whether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each case . . • " Litigation relevant to the determination of the nature of an
agreement under this provision has been profuse, and the
test formulated thereby numerous.
It has been suggested
that a lease agreement is actually a purchase and sale agreement if the "lease payments" are clearly designed to
establish an ownership interest in the "lessee~" if the
"lessee" treats the payments as building up equity in the
property concerned: or if the "lessee" is constrained to
become the owner of the property at the termination of the
lease, either by contractual agreement or as a matter of
economic compulsion. (Footnotes omitted.)
The agreement between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Centurian is subject to the law of sales under all of the foregoing criteria.

Margaret Nickles is liable to Petty Motor

Lease, Inc., the same as Centurian, having guaranteed the obligation of Centurian.

This conclusion is required because of

the trial court's determination that the agreement between Petty

-4-
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Motor and Centurian was a purchase and sale agreement ab
initio, or from the beginning; it is therefore of no consequence that Margaret Nickles did not sign the Agreement of Purchase and Sale Agreement.
was Margaret Nickles'
lease agreememt.

The only relevant inquiry is what

guarantee when she guaranteed the written

The evidence is clear that the arrangement

between Petty Motor and Centurian was that of sale and purchase
from the inception and Nickles understood the arrangement to be
a purchase.

Richard Nickles testified:

I purchased on the first day of February.
This is
when we negotiated the agreement when we bought the eguipme n t . ( Tr 12 , 13 , R . 2 4 4 , 2 4 5 . )

The cases as cited by the Court in its opinion constitute conclusive authority that the agreement between Petty Motor and Centurian was subject to the law of sales, since delivery and possession of the trailer to Centurian passed the
risk of loss to Centurian, and Margaret Nickles, having guaranteed the performance of Centurian Corporation, is liable to the
full extent that Centurian is liable.
The Lease itself, even without the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, constitutes a security interest to Petty
Motor.

The definition of "security interest" is as follows:

"Security interest" means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of
an obligation.
The retention or reservation by a seller of
goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer
(Section 70 A-2-401) is limited in effect to a reservation
of a "security interest."
. . . Whether a lease is intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
-5- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

case~ however,
(a) the inclusion of an option to purchase
does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, and (b) an agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the op-'
tion to become the owner of the property for no additional
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the
lease one intended for security. (Emphasis added.)
70A-l-201(37)

The analysis of the facts of each case to determine
whether a lease is intended as security is purely objective.
The objective analysis in this case, as to Margaret Nickles,
should be:

If Centurian had made all the payments contemplated

by the Lease,

(and had the trailer not been stolen), would Cen-

turian be constrained to become the owner of the trailer at the
termination of the Lease as a matter of economic compulsion?
See White and Summers, Uniform Commercial Code, §22-3, pp.
759-765 (West 1972).

The answer is clearly "Yes."

nal payment, the trailer could be purchased.

By a nomi-

The amount Cen-

turian would pay to purchase the trailer was substantially less
than the fair market value of the trailer.

Had the trailer not

been stolen, Margaret Nickles would certainly have asserted,
after payment of all monthly installments that Centurian was
entitled to pay the $621 and interest to buy the trailer.
Even in absence of any agreement for purchase of the
trailer at the end of the lease term, the Lease constitutes a
"security agreement."

This is because the Lease agreement, and

the disparity between the payments required under the Lease and
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those that would be required under a "true lease", secures payrnent of the obligation.
POINT II.
IF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN PETTY MOTOR AND
CENTURIAN IS CONSTRUED AS A LEASE AS ASSERTED BY MARGARET
K. NICKLES, THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES AGAINST MARGARET NICKLES
WOULD EXCEED DAMAGES AWARDED TO PETTY MOTOR.
Even if the Agreement of Sale and Purchase is disregarded as to Margaret Nickles, Centurian is responsible for the
safe-keeping and return to Petty Motor Lease, Inc. of the
trailer under the Lease.

This obligation and liability arises

because of the express provisions of the Lease, which was guaranteed by Margaret Nickles.
The Lease between Petty Motor Lease, Inc. and Centurian provides, in part as follows:
3. User agrees to continually maintain said property
in good condition • . •
7. Upon expiration or termination of this Agreement,
User shall surrender the unit to Owner in good mechanical
condition and repairr with tires having at least 50 percent
of original tread and free from body damage, scratched or
stripped paint or torn or faded upholstery.
Any expense by
Owner to bring unit to the above described condition shall
be paid for by User.
Considering the Lease only, the foregoing provisions
clearly indicate that Centurian was responsible for the care,
maintenance and return of the trailer.

By agreement, Centurian

agreed to be responsible for the return of the trailer.

A les-

see is not an insurer of safety of goods delivered to him, un-

-7-provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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less made so by statute or by express contract.
(1980), Bailments, § 215.

8 Arn.Jur.2d

As stated at 8 Am.Jur.2d (1980),

Bailments, § 150:
As a general rule; if there is an express or implied agreement by the bailee which clearly goes beyond its ordinary
obligation as implied by law, he will be held to this agreement.
In such cases the bailment contract is controlling and must be enforced according to its terms, irrespective of the fact that a less onerous liability is imposed by law on bailees of the same class generally.
For
such an undertaking, the bailment itself or the compensation to be paid for it is a sufficient consideration.
(Footnotes omitted.)
See Sumsion v. Streator-Smith Inc., 103 Utah 44, 132 P.2d 680
(1943).
The agreement of the parties may result in the lessee
becoming an insurer.

This rule is stated at 8 Am Jur.2d

(1980), Bailments, § 153:
An express agreement by the bailee, not merely to return the subject of the bailment in good condition, but to
repair all damages occasioned by accident or casualty, or
to be "responsible" for, or to repair any loss or damage,
barring ordinary wear and tear, creates an unconditional
obligation, and for loss or damage not excepted the bailee
is liable irrespective of his negligence or fault.
The
bailee becomes an insurer also where he enters into
special contract to return the property in good condition
or pay its val~e and is liable for any loss which occurs
while it is in his possession even thoug_h without his
fault.
And where he contracts specially to return the
baile~roperty in as_g_ood ~ondition as when received saving some other exception or exceptions than ordinary wear
and tear, such exceptions m~ be regarded as exclusive, and
h~ may be liable as an insurer for loss from other causes,
although without his fault.

a--

The view is generally taken that the fact that the
bailee deposits a sum of money or gives a bond as security
for the return for the bailment in good condition evidences
an intension to extend his common law liability.
There is,
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moreover, authority for the view that whenever the bailee
is deemed to have entered into a special engagement to return the property at a certain time in good order he will
not be released therefrom even where it appears that the ·
property was damaged or destroyed without his fault. ~ . ·
(Emphasis added: footnotes omitted.)
The Lease clearly places on Centurian the obligation of returning the trailer and, therefore, assuming the risk of loss of
the trailer prior to its return.
Margaret Nickles asserts that her liability under the
lease is limited to an amount less than $2,000.

The contention

is based upon the provision in the Lease that provides that if
the Lease is terminated or expires, the lessee shall pay 45% of
the monthly rental multiplied by the number of months remaining
on the lease, plus the final lease payment.

However, Margaret

Nickles totally ignores the Lease provision requiring the return of the equipment.

Thus, even accepting Margaret Nickles

argument as far as it goes, she would be liable for something
less than $2,000, plus the value of the trailer since she is
unable to perform the obligation of returning it to Petty Motor
because of the loss by theft.
Richard Nickles testified that the value of the
trailer at the time of the theft was $22,000 (Tr.14).

Walter

A. Cripps testified that the value of the trailer was between
$14,500 and $15,000 (Tr.38).

Neuman C. Petty, President of

Petty Motor Lease, Inc. testified that the value of the trailer
was between $15,000 and $16,000 (Tr.47).

-9-

Assuming the trial
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court were to find a favorable value to Margaret Nickles of
$15,000 at the time of loss, she would be obligated to Petty
Motor for approximately $17,000, exclusive of sales tax and
interest.

This amount is in excess of the amount for which

Centurian is obligated as a result of this Court's decision in
this case.
This Court is entitled to adopt as the measure of darnages awarded against Margaret Nickles the lesser amount which
will compensate Petty Motor under the provisions of the Lease
and Agreement of Sale and Purchase.

POINT III.
THE LEASE AGREEMENT MAKES CENTURIAN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE RETURN OF THE TRAILER AND FOR FAILURE TO
RETURN THE TRAILER CENTURIAN IS LIABLE FOR ITS VALUE; MARGARET NICKLES AS GUARANTOR OF THE LEASE, IS LIABLE UNDER
THE LEASE INCLUDING THE VALUE OF THE TRAILER.
Counsel for Margaret Nickles relies on the common law
rule that in the absence of negligence a lessee is not liable
for an act of the third party intervenor, such as a theft.
However, as indicated in Point II of this brief, counsel for
Ma+garet Nickles totally ignores the express provisions of the
Lease which abrogates the common law rule.
(1980)

§

150 and 153, 214 and 215.

ian to return the trailer.

See 8 Am.Jur.2d

The Lease required Centur-

For failure to do sor under the

Lease, Centurian would be liable for the value of the trailer.

-10-
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Margaret Nickles, as guarantor of the Lease, is similarly
liable.

POINT IV.
NO ELECTION OF REMEDIES IS NECESSARY OR
REQUIRED BY PETTY MOTOR LEASE.
Appellants' Brief in Support of Petition for Rehearing
asserts an election of remedy was required, was made, and bars
the claim of Petty Motor Lease against Margaret Nickles.

As

indicated in Point I, above, Margaret Nickles' liability is
identical to Centurian's, as determined by this Court.
Counsel for Centurian and Nickles misconstrues or
seeks to have this Court misapply the rule of election of remedies.

"The doctrine of election of remedies does not apply

where the available remedies are concurrent, or cumulative, and
consistent."

25 Am. Jur. 2d (1966), Election of Remedies, § 12.

The Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase, as construed by
the trial court, and as affirmed by this court, and

ai

applied

to Margaret Nickles in relation to Centurian, are concurrent or
cumulative, and consistent.

The heart of this case is the risk

of loss, as between lessor and lessee {under Margaret Nickles'
theory), or seller and buyer.

Under either theory, Centurian

bore the risk of loss, and Margaret Nickles guaranteed the
Lease, if not the agreement of purchase as well.

The risk of

loss issue is a consistent issue, regardless of the theory.
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In

addition, the agreement of Purchase and Sale is cumulative, the
trial court having found, and this Court having affirmed, that
the Lease remains in effect except as modified by the Agreement
of Sale and Purchase.

It is clear that the Lease and Agreement

of Sale and Purchase do not provide inconsistent remedies, a
requirement of an election of remedies:
Inconsistent remedies.
The doctrine of election of remedies is applicable
only where there are two or more coexistent remedies available to the litigant at the time of the election which are
repugnant and inconsistent. This rule is upon the theory
that, of several inconsistent remedies, the pursuit of one
necessarily involves or implies the negation of the
others.
The rule of irrevocable election does not apply
where the remedies are concurrent or cumulative merely, or
where they are for the enforcement of different and distinct rights or the redress of different and distinct
wrongs.
§

10.

11. -·- Test of inconsistency.
It has been said that the so-called "inconsistency of
remedies" is not in reality an inconsistency between the
remedies themselves, but must be taken to mean that a certain state of facts relied on as the basis of a certain
remedy is inconsistent with, and repugnant to, another certain state of facts relied on as the basis of another remedy.
For one proceeding to be a bar to another for inconsistency~ the remedies must proceed from opposite and irreconcilable claims of right and must be so inconsistent that
a party could not logically assume to follow one without
renouncing the other. Two modes of redress are inconsistent if the assertion of one involves the negation or repudiation of the other.
In this sense, inconsistency may
·
arise either because one remedy must allege as fact what
the other denies, or because the theory of one must necessarily be repugnant to the other. More particularly, where
the election of a remedy assumes the existence of a particular status or relation of the party to the subject matter
of litigation, another remedy is inconsistent if, in order
to seek it, the party must assume a different and inconsistent status or relation to the subject matter.
25 Arn Jur 2d (1966), Election of Remedies. {Footnotes
omitted.)
§
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Cases cited in Appellants' Brief in support of the
petition for rehearing are consistent with the foregoing and .do
not stand as a bar as asserted by counsel for Centurian.
Utah Idaho Cent. R. Co.

v.

In

Industrial Commission, 86 U. 364, 35

P. 2d 842 (1934) , this Court considered whether an employee of
the Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, injured in the course
of his employment, was injured while engaged in interstate commerce or intrastate commerce.

If injured while engaged in in-

terstate commerce, the legal remedy for the injury was under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), whereas if injured while engaged in intrastate commerce, the remedy was under the Workmen's Compensation Act of Utah.

This Court held

that the employee's bringing of an action in the Federal District Court under FELA did not constitute an election nor preelude him from thereafter claiming compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act in state court.
In Farmer & Merch. Bank v. Universal C.I.T.
Corp, 4 U. 2d 155, 289 P. 2d 1045 (1955)

Cre~it

this court stated:

The doctrine of election of remedies applies as a bar only
·where the two actions are inconsistent, generally based
upon incompatible facts~ the doctrine does not operate as
an estoppel where the two or more remedies are given to
redress the same wr.ong and are consistent.
In summary, no election of remedies was required, and
reliance on both the Lease and Agreement of Sale and Purchase
does not create an inconsistency of remedies.
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CONCLUSION
The decision of this Court is correct and complete.
Margaret Nickles is liable as the guarantor of Centurian in the
full amount awarded to Petty Motor Lease.
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied.
Dated this 9th day of March, _1981.

Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER
By~~~~~~~~~~~~-

Wayne G. Petty
Attorney for Respondent Petty
Motor Lease, Inc.
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, 1981,

two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant
were mailed, postage prepaid, to the

following~

James R. Brown, Esq.
Attorneys for Defendants in
Intervention-Respondents
370 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Bryce K. Bryner, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant-Cripps
215 East Main Street
Price, Utah 84501

-14-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

